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IV

III.

Jurisdictional Statement
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah

Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
IV.

Statement of Issues & Standard of Review
The issues in this matter and the corresponding standards of review are as follows:
A . Improper Statutory Construction
Is the express limitation of Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-12 that a grantor by warranty

deed need only defend against "lawful claims" meaningless so that such a grantor must defend
all claims, including those that are unlawful because they are brought in violation of statute and
dismissed on motion for summary judgment? The standard of review for this issue is
correctness, with no deference given to the lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R.
Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998)
Was the lower court summary judgment decision, ordering appellant Spencer to pay
attorney fees to a grantee, correct in light of the fact that those fees were incurred solely in
defending a suit which sought, as to grantee, only remedies prohibited by Utah Code
Annotated Title 57, Chapter 6, and which suit, as to grantee, was brought in violation of Title
57, Chapters 4a and 9? The standard of review for this issue is correctness, with no deference
given to the lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah
1998)
B . Improper Imposition of Duty to Defend
Is a one sentence allegation that a duty to defend title exists, alleged solely as a
conclusion of law, with no other action to present the case or facts to the party alleged to have
that duty to defend, a sufficient basis on which to impose over $40,000 in duplicative legal
expenses on the person with the alleged duty? The standard of review for this issue is
correctness, with no deference given to the lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R.
Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998)
1

Is imposition of a duty to defend title appropriate where purchaser has agreed, in
writing, that the property is being purchased "as is" with respect to title? The
standard of review for this issue is correctness, with no deference given to the lower decision.
Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998)
Is imposition of a general duty to defend title appropriate where the party being charged
to defend has entered into a written agreement with the title company which was a party to the
sale and which is the real party in interest as to the award of attorney fees, to send written
notice and demand to defend before such defense, where liability for one of the two plaintiffs is
specifically excluded, and where such notice was not sent? The standard of review for this
issue is correctness, with no deference given to the lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific
R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998)
C • Improper Standard for Decision of Summary Judgment
Was the lower court summary judgment decision, which resolved factual inferences,
including the adequacy of tender and reasonableness of attorney fees, against the non-moving
party, correct? The standard of review for this issue is correctness, with no deference given to
the lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998)
Was the lower court summary judgment decision granting summary judgment in spite
of substantial factual disputes regarding material issues, including the adequacy of tender and
reasonableness of attorney fees, correct? The standard of review for this issue is correctness,
with no deference given to the lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975 P.2d
464, 465 (Utah 1998)
D . Unreasonableness of Fees Assessed
Are attorney fees of more than $40,000 reasonable when the claim in which they are
incurred defending: is brought in violation of statute; seeks remedies prohibited by statute; is
brought 16 years after the claim arose; is based upon contracts which prohibit the remedies
sought; is based upon contracts which limit the plaintiffs' maximum recovery to $30,000; is
being defended already by another defendant; and is resolved against plaintiffs on summary
2

judgment. The standard of review for this issue is correctness, with no deference given to the
lower decision. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998)
E . Citation to Record Showing Preservation of Issues
The matters sought for review on this appeal were preserved below at Record pages 7785, 88-91, 108-126, 136-137, 216-217, 404-406, 504-505, 761-775, 779-781, 881-888,
1184-1189, 1198-1221, 1330-1345, 1380-1384, 1409-1410, 1413-1414, and transcript of
October 6, 1999 hearing.
V.

Constitutional or Statutory Provisions
Utah Code Annotated § 57-l-12Error! Bookmark not defined.
§ 57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form:
WARRANTY DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to _ (insert name), grantee, of
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the
following described tract of land in
County, Utah, to wit:
(here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this _ day of

, 19

.

Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights and privileges
thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good right
to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the
quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from all encumbrances; and
that the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives will forever warrant and
defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all
LAWFUL CLAIMS whatsoever. Any exceptions to such covenants may be
briefly inserted in such deed following the description of the land. (Emphasis
added.)
Utah Code Annotated Title 57, Chapter 6. (See Addendum.)
Utah Code Annotated Title 57, Chapter 4a.(See Addendum.)
Utah Code Annotated Title 57, Chapter 9.(See Addendum.)
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VI.

Statement of the Case
This case is the appeal of a summary judgment decision disposing of all of the issues

with respect to one of the named defendants in the case below and certified by the lower court
as a final decision. The case below was a suit by some alleged investors to obtain damages
against Mr. Spencer, and title to property as to Holmes Construction, based upon contracts
allegedly entered in 1981 or 1982. The contracts which allegedly gave rise to the plaintiffs
claims provided for dissolution of the purported partnerships no later than 1984. The suit was
not brought until 1997. Mr. Spencer had obtained record title to the property in 1994 and sold
the property to Holmes in 1996. Although they had done nothing to comply with Utah's
Occupying Claimants statute (Utah Code Annotated Title 57, Chapter 6), plaintiffs sought to
wrest title from Holmes construction by the action.
Mr. Spencer's answer asserted numerous defenses applicable to Holmes, including
failure to state a claim, lack of standing, laches, abuse of process, and statute of limitations.
Mr. Spencer's answer denied that Holmes had any liability to plaintiffs. Holmes undertook on
their own to defend title, making no demand for defense by Mr. Spencer prior to filing their
answer. In their answer they alleged, in a single sentence, that Mr. Spencer had a legal duty to
defend their title. That allegation was objected to as a legal conclusion rather than an allegation
of fact, but denied to the extent it was deemed a statement of fact.
Holmes waited approximately a year1 after the case was commenced to move for
summary judgment against plaintiffs. That motion was granted.
Thereafter, Holmes moved for summary judgment against Mr. Spencer, claiming that
Mr. Spencer had a duty to defend Holmes' title and that duty had been violated. The lower
court eventually granted that motion and certified the decision as final. This appeal was timely
filed.

1

The complaint was filed 7/18/97, Holmes' motion against plaintiffs was filed 7/1/98.
4

VII.

Statement of Facts
In 1981, one of the defendants in the case below, Mr. George Gamble, entered into a

contract to buy certain undeveloped land in the Park City area of Summit County for
development as condominiums. Later in 1981 that contract was fulfilled in sections, with one
parcel being deeded to the name "Summit Condo IV." In 1982, that property was deeded to
defendant Spencer-Gamble Development.
In late 1982 defendant Gamble abandoned all of his obligations and interests in Utah
and moved to California, leaving defendant Spencer as the sole remaining partner in SpencerGamble Development. Later, Gamble quitclaimed all of his interests to property to Mr.
Spencer. In 1994, Mr. Spencer deeded the property to himself. In 1996, after years of effort
to develop the property, Mr. Spencer sold the property to Holmes Construction. That purchase
was made subject to a contract that the property, including title, was conveyed "as is."2 As
part of the transaction, Mr. Spencer entered into a written agreement that he would defend title
only as to claims by Webster, and that Associated Title was required to provide Spencer with
written notice of their desire to have Spencer defend before any such obligation would accrue.3
In 1997, plaintiffs here brought suit, claiming that they were "partners" under joint
venture agreements with Gamble dating from 1981 and 1982 and that they were therefore
entitled to possession of the property. The terms of the documents under which plaintiffs are
claiming expressly limit them to a total of 14.81% of the net profits from the land. The gross
sale price of the land was $236,000, with the net pay out from closing, as was reported to
Holmes, being $146,000. 14.81% of $236,000 is approximately $30,000. 14.81% of

2

R. 1217,1 9.

3

R. 1204-1206, especially f 3 on p. 1204, show that only parties to the Summit Condo 4
joint venture agreement were covered. Webster was ostensibly a party to that agreement,
but Byington was not. R 1205, f 9 B & C state that Associates must place a demand on
Mr. Spencer for his obligation to indemnify to ripen.
5

$146,000 approximately $21,000.4 Plaintiffs made no efforts to comply with Utah Code
Annotated Title 57, Chapter 6, which provides that possession of property against an
occupying claimant cannot be obtained except upon strict compliance with requirements set for
therein. Plaintiffs' claims also ignore the provisions of Chapters 1, 4a, and 9 of that Title.
Plaintiffs had taken no action to perfect an ownership interest in the property at any time prior
to the filing of the suit in 1997.
When defendant Holmes was served with a suit, rather than contacting Mr. Spencer to
defend the suit, Holmes notified Associated Title to defend, and Associated Title notified their
insurer to defend, who in turn obtained a lawyer who, also without contacting Spencer,
answered and filed a cross-claim against Spencer, alleging as a conclusion of law that Spencer
had a legal duty to defend title. Other than that single conclusory allegation, Holmes never
broached the subject of Spencer defending, and, in fact, Holmes counsel rebuffed offers of
assistance made by Mr. Spencer's counsel and Holmes themselves refused Mr. Spencer's
direct offers of assistance. Associated Title never sent Mr. Spencer the notice required by his
contract.5
Holmes counsel moved for summary judgment against plaintiffs. That motion was
granted and the resulting dismissal has not been appealed. Holmes then moved for summary
judgment against Spencer, seeking over $40,000 in attorney fees based upon the alleged failure
of Spencer to defend. Spencer opposed that motion on several bases:
The claim was unlawful and therefore not subject to a duty to defend title;
There was no reasonable opportunity for Spencer to defend, his offers having been
rejected and Holmes running its own defense exclusively;
The attorney fees were excessive since the approximately $45,000 sought was more
than twice the limiting percentage of the pay out, and 50% greater than the maximum

4

R. 1332-1342, 1343-1344

5

Docket; R 108-126, 136-137.
6

possible recovery and because they were duplicative; and
Holmes' laconic allegation was legally insufficient in light of the facts and procedural
posture of the case.6
Spencer pointed out to the lower court that the "facts" in support of Holmes' motion for
summary judgment omitted to allege that (1) the amounts expended were reasonable, (2) the
amounts expended were necessary, (3) the amounts expended were actually paid for by
Holmes, (4) the amounts expended were incurred solely in defense of a "lawful claim," and (5)
the amounts expended were expended after a refusal on the part of Mr. Spencer to defend
Holmes title.7
VIII. Summary of Argument
The decision below is incorrect and must be reversed as a matter of law because it is
based upon a construction of Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-12 that renders part of that statute
meaningless and is therefore an impermissible construction. The decision below requires
defense of title in all circumstances, even when claims are facially illegal. That is contrary to
the express statutory language requiring defenses only of "lawful claims." The decision also
grants Holmes relief to which it had not completed the steps necessary to obtain the relief
granted and therefore must be reversed.
The decision below must be reversed because it imposed upon defendant Spencer a
duty to defend title in circumstances where such a duty to defend did not exist: i.e., (1) the
property title was sold with notice to the purchaser that it was being sold "as is;" (2) the only
action of purchasers that even suggests that purchasers might want Spencer to defend their title
was a one sentence allegation in Holmes' answer that alleged Mr. Spencer had a legal duty to
defend Holmes (there was no notice or demand from the title company as the contract requires);
(3) the real party in interest (the title insurance company) had signed an agreement limiting the

6

R. 761-775, 779-781.

7

Spencer's motion in opposition to Holmes summary judgment motion, Id.
1

number of people as to whom Mr. Spencer was liable to defend claims and required the title
company to give Mr. Spencer a demand, by letter, to defend. Neither of those limitations was
complied with by Holmes or their insurer.
The decision appealed is one for summary judgment. That decision must be reversed
because it was entered in the face of disputed material facts, and contrary to law, the decision
views the facts and draws all inferences against Mr. Spencer, the non-moving party.
In addition, in light of the facts that the costs assessed were incurred solely to obtain
summary judgment against claims which were brought in violation of statute; sought remedies
prohibited by statute; which were brought 16 years after the claim arose; were based upon
contracts which prohibit the remedies sought; were being defended already by Mr. Spencer; the
amount of attorney fees awarded was unreasonable and excessive.
IX.

Argument

A. Improper Statutory Construction
The court below imposed a strict liability standard for defense of title by Mr. Spencer.
The decision of the lower court makes Mr. Spencer liable for Holmes cost of defending title
without regard to whether the claims against Holmes were valid or even colorable and without
regard to whether the legal requirements for such an imposition had been met. In fact, the
plaintiffs claims against Holmes were not valid or colorable and the legal requirements for
imposition of costs and fees had not been met. At the time the decision appealed here had been
entered, Holmes summary judgment, dismissing all of plaintiffs claims against Holmes, was
final and non-appealable. Therefore, as a matter of law, those claims were invalid and not
warranted by law.
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-12 states that a grantor by warranty deed need only
defend against "lawful claims."
Plaintiffs claim against Holmes was simply not a "lawful claim," as is shown by the
fact that it was disposed of by summary judgment. Black's Law Dictionary 797 (5th ed. 1979)

8

defines "lawful" as "warranted or authorized by the law." That definition is in accord with the
use of the phrase "lawful claim" in Utah cases. For example, In re Fish's Estate, 98 Utah 288;
95 P.2d 502 (Utah 1939) involved a matter in which a stipulation for resolution of disputed
claims to a decedent's estate directed the payment of "All lawful claims, expenses, and
charges of administration, attorneys fees, Federal Estate Taxes, Federal Gift taxes, and
Inheritance taxes of the State of Utah,...." The administrators were to pay only those claims
that were "warranted or authorized by the law," and not spurious claims nor claims not so
authorized.
Tarpey v. Madsen, 17 Utah 352; 53 P. 996 (Utah 1898) involved the construction of
various homestead and railroad acts. One issue specifically decided was whether the claim of
Moroni Olney was a lawful claim. The Utah Supreme Court examined the legal requirements
for a valid claim, determined that Mr. Olney had satisfied all of them, and pronounced Mr.
Olney's claim to be "lawful." The language of the case makes it clear that if the claim of Olney
were not valid under the law the claim would not be a "lawful claim."
The lower court, by ruling that on the undisputed facts of this case there was no legal
basis for plaintiffs' claim against Holmes' title, had, at the time it issued summary judgment
against Mr. Spencer, already determined that plaintiffs' claim was not a "lawful claim." In
fact, Utah's statutes, including without limitation, Utah Code Annotated Title 57, Chapter 6,
forbid the relief requested by plaintiffs as to Holmes. Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-12 does not
require that title be defended against spurious or unlawful claims of the type brought by
plaintiffs below against Holmes.
Chapter 4a provides that all recorded documents are entitled to certain presumptions,
none of which were addressed by plaintiffs' complaint and which plaintiffs had no evidence to
rebut. Chapter 6 provides that property may not be taken from an occupying claimant who has
improved property unless certain procedures are followed. Notwithstanding the fact that
Holmes had improved the property, plaintiffs complied with none of Chapter 6's requirements
in seeking possession of the property. Chapter 9 of Title 57 provides that purchasers are

9

entitled to rely upon record title. Holmes did so and plaintiffs showed no basis to overcome
such reliance. In light of the above, it is clear that plaintiffs suit against Holmes was not a
lawful claim and therefore not one which Mr. Spencer can be required to indemnify Holmes.
Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 403, 404 (1970) establishes the
proposition that expenditures may only be recovered if they are "necessary to clear up any
difficulty which would represent a substantial flaw in his title." As is discussed above, Mr.
Spencer offered to and did provide defense of the title and the claims did not represent a
"substantial" or even a colorable, flaw in the title. The costs and fees of Holmes are therefore
not recoverable under Utah law.
The same cases also establish that there must be either a constructive or actual eviction
before there is a violation of the obligations imposed by Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-12. No
eviction of any kind, constructive or actual, has been alleged in this case. The costs and fees
are therefore, again, not recoverable.
In order to reach the result appealed here, the lower court had to render the "lawful
claim" language of the statue meaningless so that a grantor under a warranty deed must defend
all claims, including those that are unlawful because they are brought in violation of statute and
dismissed on motion for summary judgment. That contravenes the Utah rules of statutory
construction.
In Trail Mountain Coal v. Div. Of lands, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996), the Utah
Supreme Court, citing Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995), stated:
If, as Trail Mountain claims, the statute were limited to adverse
possession claims, the language "or the issues or profits thereof" would be
rendered superfluous. "This court will NOT construe a statute in such
a way as to render certain viable parts meaningless and void."
(Emphasis added.)
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995) is a particularly
compelling case for this principle because, in Nelson, the Supreme Court struck down the
entire statute rather than construe it in such a way as to make part of it meaningless.

10

Since the decision below is in violation of the Utah law upon which it ostensibly rests,
it must be reversed.
B . Improper Imposition of Duty to Defend
When Mr. Spencer sold the property to Holmes, it was done pursuant to documents
that expressly stated that property title was sold "as is." Notwithstanding that fact, the lower
court imposed upon Mr. Spencer the burden of defending Holmes title. At the time Holmes
purchased the property, the real party in interest as to the duty to defend title, Holmes' title
insurer, caused Mr. Spencer to enter into an agreement for indemnification. That
indemnification was limited to actions by certain persons. Only one of the plaintiffs in this
action, Mr. Webster, was in that category. In spite of that fact, the lower court required Mr.
Spencer to bear the entire burden of Holmes defense. In addition, the documents executed by
Mr. Spencer were written by Holmes' insurer and require that before Mr. Spencer could be
required to defend title, the insurer had to place a demand upon Mr. Spencer. They did not do
so and there is no evidence that they did. In spite of that failure, the lower court required Mr.
Spencer to pay the cost of Holmes' title defense.
Not only did the lower court impose a defense obligation where the law regarding such
obligations would not, the lower court did so in derogation of the contractual agreements of the
parties. The documents related to limitations of Mr. Spencer were before the lower court, but
they were ignored by the lower court in the decision in favor of Holmes. The decision must,
therefore, be reversed.
C . Improper Standard for Decision of Summary Judgment
In Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports
Medicine, 909 P.2d 266 (Utah App. 1995), this court stated, "In determining the propriety of a
grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the position of the
losing party. Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781. We review the trial court's legal conclusions for
correctness. Id." The lower court decision cannot stand that level of scrutiny.

11

As is discussed above, the lower court resolved all doubts and drew all inferences in
favor of Holmes. The lower court resolved the factual issue of whether Holmes had given
Spencer a reasonable opportunity to defend Holmes against Mr. Spencer. The lower court
resolved the factual issue of reasonableness of $45,000 to obtain summary judgment for a
claim that was facially illegal against Mr. Spencer.
Mr. Spencer pointed out to the lower court that Mr. Maak apparently expended over
five man-weeks (more than 200 hours) answering the complaint, performing discovery, and
moving for summary judgment. In contrast, the undersigned spent 73.25 hours during 1997
and 57.25 hours during 1998 and 1999 doing all of the same things as were done by Holmes'
counsel, as well as taking care of additional matters, such as the motions to dismiss that were
prosecuted on behalf of Holmes, among others. The total hours expended by Mr. Spencer
amount to approximately 1/2 of the time for which Holmes was awarded reimbursement.
Mr. Spencer informed the lower court by affidavit that he had offered to defend the
action for Holmes.8 That offer was ignored. Holmes never provided Mr. Spencer or his
counsel with any information necessary to defend. Mr. Spencer and his counsel nevertheless
filed motions to dismiss, undertook discovery, and did all other acts they could to remove
Holmes from the suit, including joining in the motion for summary judgment which ultimately
succeeded in accomplishing that end.
According to 59 Am Jur 2d Parties, § 187, 'tendering the defense' is a device to bring
in a person not present in the action and offer that person "an opportunity to appear and defend
the action." As is discussed above, Mr. Spencer answered the complaint and attacked
plaintiffs' claims. Without some cooperation and communication from Holmes, it was
impossible for Spencer to do more than he did. A "tender" must be more than a mere recitation
of words if it is to be effective. All of the above, and the facts to support the same were

8

R. 761-763, 779-781.
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presented to the lower court. Notwithstanding that dispute of fact, the lower court made the
factual determination that Mr. Spencer had refused to defend Holmes.
The lower court assumed, among other things, that the following facts, which were not
alleged by Holmes, were true: (1) the amounts expended were reasonable, (2) the amounts
expended were necessary, (3) the amounts expended were actually paid for by Holmes, (4) the
amounts expended were incurred solely in defense of a "lawful claim," and (5) the amounts
expended were expended after a refusal on the part of Mr. Spencer to defend Holmes title.
None of those facts were supported by appropriate evidence below and all were disputed by
Mr. Spencer.
Because the lower court's decision violates the standards for granting summary
judgment, the decision must be reversed.
D . Unreasonableness of Fees Assessed
Holmes was awarded attorney fees and costs of more than $40,000. Those fees were
for work which was largely duplicative of work performed by Mr. Spencer's attorney and
which could have been avoided had Holmes accepted Mr. Spencer's offers of help.
Furthermore, as is discussed above, the claims against Holmes were facially improper. It is
prima facie unreasonable to run up legal bills for a year before moving to dismiss such claims.
There was nothing that was done by Holmes' counsel after expending the large amount of fees
that could not have been done immediately upon receipt of the complaint. The fees awarded
were therefore unreasonable and must be reduced or eliminated.
X.

Conclusion
The decision of the court being appealed was wrong on the law and unsupported by

facts, when considered under the applicable standard. The decision must therefore be
reversed.
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Since the award was based upon a failure to follow the law of the state of Utah, and
since that law prevents the award granted, that reversal should be final and not associated with
a remand.
Dated: Tuesday, January 9, 2001

Timothy Miguel Willardson
Attorney for Appellant
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XI.

Addendum (Emphasis added.)

CHAPTER 4a EFFECTS OF RECORDING
57-4a-l. Document recordable despite defects.
Each document executed and acknowledged on or before July 1,1988, may be
recorded in the office of the county recorder regardless of any defect or irregularity in its
execution, attestation, or acknowledgment.
57-4a-2. Recorded document imparts notice of contents despite defects.
A recorded document imparts notice of its contents regardless of any defect,
irregularity, or omission in its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment. A certified copy of a
recorded document is admissible as evidence to the same extent the original document would be
admissible as evidence.
57-4a-3. Document recordable without acknowledgment.
A document or a certified copy of a document may be recorded without
acknowledgment if:
(1) it was executed under law existing at the time of execution;
(2) it evidences or affects title to real property; and
(3) it was issued under the authority of:
(a) the United States, another state, a court of record, a foreign government, or an
Indian tribe; or
(b) this state or any of its political subdivisions but, any document executed under the
authority of this state or any of its political subdivisions after July 1, 1988, may not be
recorded unless it includes a certificate of acknowledgement or jurat.
57-4a-4. Presumptions.
5)

A recorded document creates the following presumptions
regarding title to the real property affected:
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(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person purporting to
execute it;
(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf it
is executed are the persons they purport to be;
(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a
minor at any relevant time;
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates
on the document and the date of recording;
(e) any necessary consideration was given;
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or
described by the document acted in good faith at all relevant times;
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer
of an organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity:
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope of
his authority;
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized under all
applicable laws to act on behalf of the organization; and
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he acted
for a principal who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any relevant time;
(h) a person executing the document as an individual:
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was married on the
effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona fide purchaser and the grantor received
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth so that the joinder of the
nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 75-2-201 through 75-2-207;
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final determination in a
judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed pursuant to a power of eminent domain,
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the court, official body, or condemnor acted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the
execution of the document were taken; and
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including without
limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are
true.
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the
document purports only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or
interest of the person executing it or the person on whose behalf it is
executed.

CHAPTER 6 OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS
57-6-1. Stay of execution of judgment of possession.
Where an occupant of real estate has color of title to the real estate, and in
good faith has made valuable improvements on the real estate, and is
afterwards in a proper action found not to be the owner, no execution shall
issue to put the owner in possession of the real estate after the filing of a
complaint as hereinafter provided, until the provisions of this chapter have
been complied with.
57-6-2. Claimant to commence action - Complaint - Trial of issues.
Such complaint must set forth the grounds on which the defendant seeks
relief, stating as accurately as practicable the value of the real estate, exclusive
of the improvements thereon made by the claimant or his grantors, and the
value of such improvements. The issues joined thereon must be tried as in law actions,
and the value of the real estate and of such improvements must be separately ascertained on the
trial.
57-6-3. Rights of parties - Acquiring other f s interest or holding as
tenants in common.
The plaintiff in the main action may thereupon pay the appraised value of the
improvements and take the property, but should he fail to do so after a reasonable time, to be
fixed by the court, the defendant may take the property upon paying its value, exclusive of the
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improvements. If this is not done within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, the parties
will be held to be tenants in common of all the real estate, including the improvements, each
holding an interest proportionate to the values ascertained on the trial.
57-6-4. Certain persons considered to hold under color of title.
(1) A purchaser in good faith at any judicial or tax sale made by the proper person or
officer has color of title within the meaning of this chapter, whether or not the person or officer
has sufficient authority to sell, unless the want of authority was known to the purchaser at the
time of the sale.
(2) (a) Any person has color of title who has occupied a tract of real
estate by himself, or by those under whom he claims, for the term of five
years, or who has occupied it for less time, if he, or those under whom he
claims, have at any time during the occupancy with the knowledge or consent,
express or implied, of the real owner made any valuable improvements on the
real estate, or if he or those under whom he claims have at any time during the
occupancy paid the ordinary county taxes on the real estate for any one year,
and two years have elapsed without a repayment by the owner, and the
occupancy is continued up to the time at which the action is brought by which
the recovery of the real estate is obtained.
(b) The person's rights shall pass to his assignees or representatives.
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to give tenants color of title against their
landlords or give any person a claim under color of title to school or institutional trust lands as
defined in Subsection 53C-1-103(6).
57-6-5. Settlers under state or federal law or contract deemed occupying
claimants.
When any person has settled upon any real estate and occupied the same for three years
under or by virtue of any law or contract with the proper officers of the state for the purchase
thereof, or under any law of, or by virtue of any purchase from, the United States, and shall
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have made valuable improvements thereon, and shall be found not to be the owner thereof, or
not to have acquired a right to purchase the same from the state or the United States, such
person shall be an occupying claimant within the meaning of this chapter.
57-6-6. Setoff against claim for improvements.
In the cases above provided for, if the occupying claimant has committed any injury to
the real estate by cutting timber, or otherwise, the plaintiff may set the same off against any
claim for improvements made by the claimant.
57-6-7. When execution on judgment of possession may issue.
The plaintiff in the main action is entitled to an execution to put him in possession of his
property in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, but not otherwise.
57-6-8. Improvements made by occupants of land granted to stateAny person having improvements on any real estate granted to the state in aid of any
work of internal improvement, whose title thereto is questioned by another, may remove such
improvements without injury otherwise to such real estate, at any time before he is evicted
therefrom, or he may claim and have the benefit of this chapter by proceeding as herein
directed.

CHAPTER 9 MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE
57-9-1. What constitutes marketable record title.
Any person having the legal capacity to own land in this state, who has an unbroken
chain of title of record to any interest in land for forty years or more, shall be deemed to have a
marketable record title to such interest as defined in Section 57-9-8, subject only to the matters
stated in Section 57-9-2. A person shall be deemed to have such an unbroken chain
of title when the official public records disclose a conveyance or other title
transaction, of record not less than forty years at the time the marketability is
to be determined, which said conveyance or other title transaction purports to
create such interest, either in
(1) the person claiming such interest or
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(2) some other person from whom, by one or more conveyances or other title
transactions of record, such purported interest has become vested in the person claiming such
interest with nothing appeanng of record, m either case, purporting to divest such claimant of
such purported interest.
57-9-2. Rights and interests to which marketable record title is subject.
The marketable record title is subject to:
(1) all interests and defects which are inherent m the muniments of which such chain of
record title is formed, except that a general reference m the muniments or any of them, to
easements, use restnctions, or other interests created pnor to the root of title is not sufficient to
preserve them, unless specific identification is made therein of a recorded title transaction
which creates the easement, use restnction, or other interest;
(2) all interests preserved by the filing of proper notice or by possession by the same
owner continuously for a penod of 40 years or more, in accordance with Section 57-9-4,
(3) the nghts of any person ansmg from prescnptive use or a penod of adverse
possession or user, which was m whole or m part subsequent to the effective date of the root
of title;
(4) any interest ansmg out of a title transaction which has been recorded subsequent to
the effective date of the root of title from which the unbroken chain of title of record is started,
except that the recording does not revive or give validity to any interest which has been
extinguished pnor to the time of the recording by the operation of Section 57-9-3; and
(5) the exceptions stated in Section 57-9-6 as to nghts of reversioners m leases, as to
apparent easements and interests m the nature of easements, as to the nght, title, or interests of
the state m school or institutional trust lands or sovereign lands, and as to interests of the
United States.
57-9-3. Marketable record title held free and clear of interests, claims,
and charges.
Subject to Sections 57-9-2 and 57-9-6:
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(1) the marketable record title shall be held by its owner and shall be taken by any
person dealing with the land free and clear of all interests, claims, or charges, whatsoever, the
existence of which depends upon any act, transaction, event, or omission that occurred prior to
the effective date of the root of title; and
(2) all such interests, claims, or charges, however denominated, whether legal or
equitable, present or future, whether the interests, claims, or charges are asserted by a person
sui juris or under a disability, whether the person is within or without the state, whether the
person is natural or corporate, or is private or governmental, are declared to be void.
57-9-4. Filing of notice of claim of interest authorized - Effect of
possession of land by record owner of possessory interest.
(1) Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep effective such
interest by filing for record during the forty-year period immediately following the effective
date of the root of title of the person whose record title would otherwise be marketable, a notice
in writing, duly verified by oath, setting forth the nature of the claim. No disability or lack of
knowledge of any kind on the part of anyone shall suspend the running of the forty-year
period. The notice may be filed for record by the claimant or by any other person acting in
behalf of any claimant who is
(a) under a disability,
(b) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or
(c) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or is uncertain at the time of
filing the notice of claim for record.
(2) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in land has been in possession
of such land continuously for a period of forty years or more, during which period no title
transaction with respect to such interest appears of record in his chain of title, and no notice has
been filed by him or on his behalf as provided in Subsection (1), and such possession
continues to the time when marketability is being determined, such period of possession shall
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be deemed equivalent to the filing of the notice immediately preceding the termination of the
forty-year period described in Subsection (1).
57-9-5. Notice of claim of interest - Contents - Filing for record.
In order to be effective and to be recorded, the notice required by Section 57-9-4 shall
contain a legal description of all land affected by the notice. If the claim is founded upon a
recorded instrument, then the description in the notice may be the same as that contained in the
recorded instrument. The notice shall be recorded in the county or counties where the land
described is situated.
57-9-6. Applicability of provisions.
This act may not be applied to bar:
(1) any lessor or his successor as a reversioner of his right to possession on the
expiration of any lease; or
(2) extinguish any easement or interest in the nature of an easement created or held for
any pipeline, highway, railroad or public utility purpose, or any easement or interest in the
nature of an easement, the existence of which is clearly observable by physical evidence of its
use; or
(3) extinguish any water rights, whether evidenced by decrees, by certificates of
appropriation, by diligence claims to the use of surface or underground water or by water
users' claims filed in general determination proceedings; or
(4) extinguish any right, title, estate, or interest in and to minerals, and any
development, mining, production or other rights or easements related to the minerals or
exercisable in connection with the minerals; or
(5) any right, title, or interest of the state in school or institutional trust lands or
sovereign lands; or
(6) any right, title, or interest of the United States, by reason of failure to file the notice
herein required.
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57-9-7. Existing statutes of limitations and recording statutes not
affected.
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to extend the period for the
bringing of an action or for the doing of any other required act under any
statutes of limitations, nor, except as herein specifically provided, to affect
the operation of any statutes governing the effect of the recording or the
failure to record any instrument affecting land.
57-9-8.

Definitions.

As used in this act:
(1) The words "marketable record title" mean a title of record as indicated in Section 579-1, which operates to extinguish such interests and claims, existing prior to the effective date
of the root of title, as are stated in Section 57-9-3.
(2) The word "records" includes probate and other official public records, as well as
records in the registry of deeds.
(3) The word "recording," when applied to the official public records of a probate or
other court, includes filing.
(4) The words "person dealing with land" include a purchaser of any estate or interest
therein, a mortgagee, a levying or attaching creditor, a land contract vendee, or any other
person seeking to acquire an estate or interest therein, or impose a lien thereon.
(5) The words "root of title" mean that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain
of title of a person, purporting to create the interest claimed by such person, upon which he
relies as a basis for the marketability of his title, and which was the most recent to be recorded
as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being determined. The effective
date of the "root of title" is the date on which it is recorded.
(6) The words "title transaction" mean any transaction affecting title to any interest in
land, including title by will or descent, title by tax deed, or by trustee's, referee's, guardian's,
executor's, administrator's, master in chancery's, or sheriffs deed, or decree of any court, as
well as warranty deed, quitclaim deed, or mortgage.
57-9-9. Legislative purpose and construction.
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This act shall be liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of
simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely
on a record chain of title as described in Section 57-9-1 of this act, subject
only to such limitations as appear in Section 57-9-2 of this act.
57-9-10. Extension of limitation period.
If the forty-year period specified in this act shall have expired prior to two years after
the effective date of this act, such period shall be extended two years after the effective date of
this act.

24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I Hereby Certify that I caused to be delivered as specified below, on the date specified
below, two true and correct copies of the foregoing "INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT" to
the following
Bruce A Maak
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless
185 S State Street, Suite 1300
PO Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

Sent via
t--"Mail
Facsimile
Hand-delivery

•^2

Da,e

25

'/9'Or

